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THE FUTURE OF SOLID WASTE IMPORT BANS UNDER
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: FORT
GRATIOT SANITARY LANDFILL, INC. v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in
different instances, given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples
of this nature, if not restrained by a national control,
would be multiplied and extended till they became not
less serious sources of animosity and discord than injuri-
ous impediments to the intercourse between the differ-
ent parts of the Confederacy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As our country nears the end of the 20th Century, there is
little question that the problems associated with the disposal of
our nation's garbage are nearing crisis proportions.2 Unfortu-
nately, while almost all would agree that there is a solid waste
problem, there is no consensus on how to solve it. As existing
landfills become filled to capacity, states must either develop new
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. There have been many articles written in recent years discussing the is-
sue. See, e.g., Anne Ziebarth, Environmental Law: Solid Waste Transport and Disposal
Across State Lines-The Commerce Clause Versus the Garbage Crisis, 1990 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 365 (1991); Michael R. Harpring, Comment, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage:
Municipal Solid Waste and the Need for Congressional Action, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 851
(1991); David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989).
Over 179 million tons of municipal solid waste are generated in the United
States each year. Ann R. Mesnikoff, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause Bar-
rier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1992).The four major
ways in which states handle this vast solid waste problem are: source reduction,
recycling, incineration, and landfilling. However, landfills ultimately receive
80% of all solid waste generated in this country. Jonathan P. Meyers, Note,
Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing
Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 570 (1991). Considering that
40% of all landfills operating in the United States may become filled to capacity
by 1995, it is clear that the nation's solid waste problem is growing at a rapid
pace. David Wartinbee, Note, Swim Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County:
Our Barriers to Solid Wastes Are Growing, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 527, 528 (1990).
(395)
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landfill sites or export their solid waste to landfill facilities in
other states.3 Given the prevailing "Not In My Back Yard"
mentality4 in most communities, attempts to establish new landfill
facilities are often politically infeasible. 5 Therefore, the latter op-
tion is frequently embraced. 6
Not surprisingly, however, states which have traditionally ac-
cepted out-of-state waste into their landfills have become increas-
ingly concerned about their ability to meet their own future waste
disposal needs. To alleviate these concerns, several states have
attempted during the last twenty years to erect barriers to the im-
portation of out-of-state waste. 7 Unfortunately, in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey,8 the Supreme Court held that state imposed
bans on the importation of wastes are, as a general rule, an imper-
missible infringement on interstate commerce.9
Despite City of Philadelphia, state legislatures in the interven-
ing years have continued to implement a variety of environmental
policies which effectively restrict the importation of waste into
3. See Meyers, supra note 2, at 571-72.
4. This phenomenon is often referred to by the acronym "NIMBY." For a
fuller discussion of the "NIMBY" phenomenon, see Orlando E. Delogu,
"NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198 (1990).
5. "In 1988 approximately two-thirds of Americans opposed the siting of
landfill facilities near their homes." Meyers, supra note 2, at 572. Citizen groups
have several means by which to oppose the creation of new landfills including:
legal delay, political pressure, legislative exemption, gubernatorial override, and
extra-legal activities. Id.
Of course, there are other reasons why new landfill sites might not be a
viable option for some communities. The geological characteristics of some ar-
eas make creating landfills environmentally inappropriate. Pomper, supra note 2,
at 1336 n. 147. Also, the costs of building and operating a landfill site present a
further obstacle for already financially strained state and local governments. See
Mesnikoff, supra note 2, at 1230. Interestingly, while states like New Jersey and
Michigan have attempted to prevent out-of-state waste from being dumped
within their borders, other states have passed legislation which prohibits solid
waste from being exported. See id. at 1231-33 (discussing Rhode Island and
Minnesota statutes placing prohibitions on export of solid waste). These laws
are designed to protect in-state landfill facilities whose costs make them unable
to compete with landfill owners in other states. See id. Unfortunately, export
bans are in many ways just as vulnerable to attack under the Commerce Clause
as are import bans. Id. at 1238.
6. According to recent estimates, over 15 million tons of solid waste are
transported in interstate commerce annually. See Mesnikoff, supra note 2, at
1220.
7. Meyers, supra note 2, at 575. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(a) (Supp.
1992); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 299.301-.437 (1987 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147:28 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West 1978) (repealed
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.101-.1003 (1977 & Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-19-13.1 (1989).
8. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
9. Id. at 629.
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their states.' 0 By interpreting City of Philadelphia narrowly, these
states had hoped to use alternative means to reach the same re-
sult: preserving their states' landfill capacity by curbing the im-
portation of out-of-state waste. However, in Fort Gratiot Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources Il and Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt,' 2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the ba-
sic tenets of City of Philadelphia by rejecting the attempts of Michi-
gan and Alabama to circumvent the holding in that case.
This Note analyzes the Fort Gratiot decision in the context of
City of Philadelphia as well as other relevant Dormant Commerce
Clause' 3 cases. While showing that the Fort Gratiot decision is
faithful to general principles of constitutional law established in
prior cases, this Note will demonstrate the significance which this
decision will have on attempts to solve the problems of solid
waste disposal at both the state and national level. Two major
propositions will be asserted: 1) State and local governments will
continue to possess considerable power to manage the allocation
of landfill space within their borders; and 2) Congress, being the
proper body to make national environmental policy under our
constitutional system, will be more likely to enact comprehensive
solid waste management legislation after Fort Gratiot.
II. FACTS
In 1978, to address the mounting problems of solid waste
10. See Meyers, supra note 2, at 575 ("Approximately twenty-five states have
either passed or are considering laws that would restrict the amount of out-of-
state waste allowed to cross their borders."). Minnesota, Michigan, Alabama,
and Oregon are among the states which have placed restrictions on the importa-
tion of waste. Id.
In addition to legislative acts, governors have promulgated executive orders
which restrict waste imports. See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L. REV. 131, 132-34 (1990) (discussing W. Va.
Executive Order No. 6-87 (1987) and Pa. Executive Order 1989-8 (1989)).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
12. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). In Chemical Waste Management, Inc., an Alabama
statute imposed a tax on hazardous wastes disposed of at in-state landfill facili-
ties. Although this fee was presumably legitimate, the Supreme Court found an
additional tax imposed on hazardous waste imported into Alabama from out-of-
state unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2011. For a general
discussion of tax discrimination under the Commerce Clause, see Philip M.
Tatarowecz and Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Dis-
crimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879 (1986).
13. The Supreme Court has consistently found that the Commerce Clause
places an implicit limitation on the power of states to regulate or interfere with
interstate commerce. This limitation on the states is commonly referred to as
the "Dormant Commerce Clause." For a general discussion of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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disposal within Michigan, the state legislature enacted a compre-
hensive Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA). 14 The SWMA re-
quired every county within the state to estimate the amount of
solid waste' 5 which it would generate within the next twenty years
and formulate a plan for disposing of this waste in compliance
with state health standards.' 6 St. Clair County17 subsequently de-
vised a solid waste management plan which was approved by the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources in 1983.18 Signifi-
14. 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 641 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 299.401-.437 (West Supp. 1992)). The original act as well as
amendments made to it prior to 1988 were never contested by Ft. Gratiot and
remain effective even after the decision. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023.
15. Solid waste is defined by the SWMA as follows:
Sec. 7.(1) "Solid waste" means garbage, rubbish, ashes, incinerator ash,
incinerator residue, street cleanings, municipal and industrial sludges,
solid commercial and solid industrial waste, and animal waste other
than organic waste generated in the production of livestock and poul-
try. Solid waste does not include the following:
(a) Human body waste.
(b) Organic waste generated in the production of livestock and poultry.
(c) Liquid waste.
(d) Ferrous or nonferrous scrap directed to a scrap metal processor or
to a reuser of ferrous or nonferrous products.
(e) Slag or slag products directed to a slag processor or to a reuser of
slag or slag products.
(f) Sludges and ashes managed as recycled or nondetrimental materials
appropriate for agricultural or silvicultural use pursuant to a plan
approved by the director.
(g) Materials approved for emergency disposal by the director.
(h) Source separated materials.
(i) Site separated materials.
(j) Fly ash or any other ash produced from the combustion of coal...
(k) other wastes regulated by statute.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 299.407(7) (West Supp. 1992). For the purposes of
this Note, the term "solid waste" will be given the same meaning as that used in
Michigan's SWMA.
16. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2021-22; see also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 299.425 (West 1984).
17. St. Clair County is located approximately 25 miles northeast of Detroit
in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. It borders both Lake Huron and
Lake St. Clair. Thus, it is conveniently located for the purposes of land and
water transportation. HAMMOND'S GOLD MEDALLION WORLD ATLAS 250 (1989).
Given its geographical accessibility, it is not surprising that the Fort Gratiot
landfill appealed to other counties and states wishing to dispose of their solid
waste.
St. Clair County, as well as the State of Michigan, was a defendant in the suit
brought by Ft. Gratiot and remained a party through the case's final disposition
before the Supreme Court. There are references throughout this Note to argu-
ments made by the State of Michigan. It should be assumed that St. Clair
County joined and supported these arguments even though St. Clair County will
not be mentioned by name unless it is crucial to an understanding of the case.
18. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
931 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992). The plan
4
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cantly, St. Clair County's plan made no provisions for the impor-
tation of waste from outside the county.19
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Ft. Gratiot) is a privately
owned company which has operated a landfill in St. Clair County
since 1971.20 In 1987, Ft. Gratiot was issued a permit to operate
a sanitary landfill in St. Clair County. 21 In December 1988, the
Michigan Legislature amended the SWMA to impose restrictions
on the importation of out-of-county waste.2 2 On February 13,
1989, Ft. Gratiot applied to the St. Clair County Solid Waste
Planning Committee 23 for approval to accept 1,750 tons of out-
of-state waste per day.2 4 Even though Ft. Gratiot had promised to
reserve enough space to handle the solid waste disposal needs of
St. Clair County for the next twenty years, its application was
denied.25
Ft. Gratiot immediately sought declaratory judgment in fed-
eral district court claiming that the 1988 Waste Import Restric-
was supposed to be updated every five years, but as of 1988 St. Clair County had
not completed its preparation of an updated solid waste management plan. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 414. Fort Gratiot is owned by Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. In
the lower court decisions, in fact, "Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc." appears in
the case name. See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
1991), rev'd sub nom. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992). Thus, it is important not to get con-
fused by the different names and understand that both names refer to the same
entity.
21. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2022.
22. Id. The waste import restrictions provide: "A person shall not accept
for disposal solid waste . . . that is not generated in the county in which the
disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid waste.., that is not gener-
ated in the county is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste
management plan." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 299.413a (West Supp. 1992).
"In order for a disposal area to serve the disposal needs of another county, state,
or country, the service... must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid
waste management plan of the receiving county." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 299.430(2).
23. The County Solid Waste Planning Committee had the responsibility of
developing and updating St. Clair County's Solid Waste Management Plan.
However, the committee acted only in an advisory capacity and lacked the au-
thority to give final approval to the plan. For the plan to become effective, it
needed to gain approval from the County Board of Commissioners, two-thirds
of the county's municipalities, and finally the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources. Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 414-15.
24. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2022.
25. Id. According to the staff report of the St. Clair County Metropolitan
Planning Commission, the 1988 amendments to the SWMA combined with the
absence of any authority in the county's solid waste management plan to allow
the importation of out-of-county waste gave the Commission no choice but to
reject Ft. Gratiot's application. Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 762.
1993] 399
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tions were unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.26 Ft.
Gratiot argued that the 1988 amendments together with the
county's failure to provide for the acceptance of out-of-county
waste in its management plan and the Planning Commission's de-
nial of its application constituted impermissible discrimination
against interstate commerce.2 7 The district court denied Ft.
Gratiot's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint. 28
The district court found that the SWMA amendments sur-
vived Commerce Clause scrutiny for three reasons. First, the stat-
ute did not discriminate on its face because the import
restrictions applied both to counties within Michigan and to out-
of-state exporters of waste. 29 Second, the statute did not discrim-
inate in "practical effect" because each county was given discre-
tion to accept out-of-state waste.30 Third, any incidental effect on
interstate commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to the
public health and environmental benefits derived from the stat-
ute.3 1 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
26. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2022. In the district court and in the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Fort Gratiot also argued that even if the statute
was constitutional its due process rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments
were violated. Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 418; Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 765.
The two lower courts dismissed this part of Ft. Gratiot's argument in summary
fashion. See Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 418; Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 765.
The court of appeals determined that there was no taking of property since Ft.
Gratiot could still operate the landfill for local waste. Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at
418. In reaching its conclusion, the court found the burdens placed on Ft. Gra-
tiot analogous to permissible burdens imposed by zoning laws. Id. Second, the
court said that Fort Gratiot could not claim that it had been denied notice and an
opportunity to be heard since it had failed to pursue available statutory reme-
dies. Id. The lower courts were probably correct in their determination. How-
ever, since this aspect of the case was not preserved on appeal to the Supreme
Court and is not relevant to the present discussion of the Commerce Clause, it
will not be examined further.
27. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2022; Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 762.
28. Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 766.
29. Id. at 764. Of course, this is not literally true since the Michigan county
imposing the restriction is not limited in its exportation of solid waste by its own
disposal plan.
30. Id. at 764-65. Under the Michigan statute, no county was forbidden
from accepting out-of-county waste. In fact, each county was entitled to inde-
pendently adopt a comprehensive plan which allowed the importation of out-of-
county waste. Thus, the district court distinguished the statute from the one
struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978), discussed infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text, where a
single state official was given unlimited authority to completely ban the importa-
tion of out-of-state waste. Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 764.
31. Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 765.
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district court's analysis and affirmed the decision.3 2
The United States Supreme Court granted Ft. Gratiot's peti-
tion for certiorari33 because of an apparent conflict between the
circuit court's decision and the standard set forth in City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey.34 The Court reversed the court of appeals in
a 7-2 decision,3 5 concluding that the 1988 amendments to the
SWMA were facially discriminatory to interstate commerce.3 6
Therefore, the Court rejected the lower courts' determination
that City of Philadelphia was not controlling and struck down the
waste import restrictions as an unconstitutional infringement on
the Commerce Clause.3 7
III. BACKGROUND
When the Constitution was written, it is difficult to imagine
even its most ardent supporters ever contemplating that the fed-
eral government would become involved in deciding problems of
municipal solid waste.3 8 Today, the responsibility for managing
the problems of solid waste in the United States remains, by and
large, a matter of local concern.3 9 Furthermore, the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution 40 would appear to give the states
the authority to institute their own policies in the realm of solid
32. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023 (citing Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 417-18).
Both the district and appellate courts found that the statute did not discriminate
against interstate commerce on its face. Id. Therefore, it was not subject to the
test set forth in City of Philadelphia. Rather, the courts applied the more lenient
test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), discussed infra notes 59-
61 and accompanying text.
However, the court of appeals did note in dictum that if all counties in Mich-
igan had in fact banned out-of-state waste, then under the City of Philadelphia
standard the case might very well have been decided differently and in favor of
Ft. Gratiot. Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 418.
33. Certiorari was granted at 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
34. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023.
35. Id. at 2021. Justice Stevens gave the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote a dissenting opinion, discussed
infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
36. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028.
37. Id. at 2025-26.
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
39. See Bruce Aber, Note, State Regulation of Out-Of-State Garbage Subject to
Dormant Commerce Clause Review and the Market Participant Exception, 1 FORDHAM
ENvTL. L. REP. 99, 101 (1989). The predominant role of local and state govern-
ment in this area is illustrated by enterprises ranging from municipal trash col-
lection to modern recycling programs. Id.
40. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1993]
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waste management while at the same time precluding interfer-
ence in this regard from the federal government. 4 1 Nevertheless,
the apparent sovereignty of the states in this area has been drasti-
cally limited and curtailed by the Commerce Clause.42 This ero-
sion has been the result of both affirmative acts of Congress 43 as
well as judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 44
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
has consistently maintained that the states may not isolate them-
selves economically from their sister states.45 When Congress has
41. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
however, the Supreme Court demonstrated its unwillingness to find Congres-
sional legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause unconstitutional on 10th
Amendment grounds. The Court in Garcia held that a state-owned bus company
was not immune from federal minimum wage laws under the 10th Amendment.
Id. For a general discussion of the impact of Garcia on efforts to restrict the
interstate transportation of solid waste, see James Hinshaw, Note, The Dormant
Commerce Clause After Garcia: An Application to the Interstate Commerce of Sanitary
Landfill Space, 67 IND. L.J. 511 (1992).
42. The Constitution, under the Commerce Clause, grants Congress the
power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For an overview of the limitations placed on the
states by the Commerce Clause, see Meyers, supra note 2.
43. The best example of federal legislation tackling the problem of solid
waste is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6942-6949 (1988). Unfortunately, in comparison with the federal govern-
ment's active regulation of other environmental problems, e.g., nuclear and haz-
ardous waste, the supervision of solid waste management has been largely
neglected. See Meyers, supra note 2, at 569. Thus, while the Commerce Clause
enables Congress to institute a comprehensive national system for the disposal
of solid waste, presently no such system exists. See id. The result is a conflicting
pattern of state regulations. See id. In addition to the inefficiencies created by
conflicting regulatory schemes, states lack the power to effectively solve the solid
waste crisis because of the restrictions placed on them by the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, discussed infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
44. In City of Philadelphia, the Court summarized its role in interpreting the
Commerce Clause vis-a-vis the states as follows:
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate com-
merce among the States, many subjects of potential federal regulation
under that power inevitably escape congressional attention "because of
their local character and their number and diversity." In the absence of
federal legislation, these subjects are open to control by the States so
long as they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause
itself. The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Com-
merce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect
to its basic purpose.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
45. In H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), Justice Jack-
son, in an often quoted passage, articulated the reasoning for the Court's
position:
The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national
power and an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the
state. While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states, it does not say what the states may or may
8
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not directly addressed an issue concerning interstate commerce,
the states are implicitly limited in their power to pass legislation
which infringes on that area. 46 However, this limitation on the
states does not amount to a complete prohibition. If a state is
exercising a legitimate police power, for example, the Court will
ordinarily find such action constitutional if it creates merely an
incidental and minimal effect on interstate commerce. 47
Although Congress' right to preempt state regulation of solid
waste is not seriously challenged today, the limits which the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause places on the states are not so clear.48
Whether a particular state law is found to violate the Commerce
Clause depends to a large extent on a subjective balancing of
competing state and federal interests. 49 Thus, although the
Court has developed guidelines to distinguish permissible from
impermissible state regulations, it is hard to predict with much
certainty which laws will pass constitutional scrutiny. 50
not do in the absence of congressional action, nor how to draw the line
between what is and what is not commerce among the states. Perhaps
even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has
advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it
has given to these great silences of the Constitution .... This Court
consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their own com-
mercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce,
either into or out of the state, while generally supporting their right to
impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of health and
safety .... This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which
alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy,
including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign
competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable eco-
nomic units.
Id. at 534-38.
46. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779-80 (1945)
("[W]ithout controlling Congressional action, a state may not regulate interstate
commerce so as substantially to affect its flow or deprive it of needed uniformity
in its regulation .... ").
47. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 139, 142 (1970). The Pike deci-
sion is discussed infra at notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
48. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23.
49. The Court explained the reasoning behind its balancing approach in
Southern Pac. Co. as follows:
In the application of these principles [underlying the commerce clause]
some enactments may be plainly within and others plainly without state
power. But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases in
which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of
commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommo-
dation of the competing demands of the state and national interests
involved.
Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 768-79.
50. See Pike, 397 U.S. at.142.
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The benchmark case in the area of solid waste import bans is
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.5 1 In that case, Philadelphia chal-
lenged a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of
most solid waste into the state.52 In determining that the New
Jersey law was an impermissible restriction on interstate com-
merce, the Court explained the standard under which regulations
governing the interstate transportation of waste were to be
judged.53 The Court differentiated between two types of barriers
against interstate commerce: 1) those which are protectionist in
nature, and 2) those which are evenhanded but have an incidental
effect on interstate commerce. 54
In City of Philadelphia, the Court found the statute to be pro-
tectionist. 55 As such, it fell under a per se rule of invalidity. Even
51. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). For commentaries on City of Philadelphia, see Su-
san Adams Brietzke, Note, Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce: Minimizing the
Problem After City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 77 (1989);
Johnson, supra note 10; Pomper, supra note 2.
52. The statute under review in City of Philadelphia provided:
"No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State,
except garbage to be fed to swine in the state of New Jersey, until the
commissioner [of the State Department of Environmental Protection]
shall determine that such action can be permitted without endangering
the public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations
permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in
this State."
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618-19 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West
Supp. 1978)). Pursuant to this statute, the Commissioner promulgated regula-
tions which, except for four narrowly defined categories, prohibited the importa-
tion of all out-of-state waste. Id. at 619 & n.2.
53. As a preliminary matter, the Court rejected the New Jersey Supreme
Court's finding that the transportation of waste regulated by the statute did not
constitute an "article of commerce" and thus did not warrant Commerce Clause
protection. The Court repudiated the idea that the transportation of solid waste
did not constitute commerce simply because the waste itself lacked any commer-
cial value. Id. at 621-23. The Court clarified the apparent contradiction be-
tween this view and that of previous cases as follows:
In [those cases which were found to withstand commerce clause scru-
tiny], the Court held simply that because the articles' worth in interstate
commerce was far out-weighed by the dangers inhering in their very
movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state line.
Hence, we reject the state court's suggestion that the banning of "val-
ueless" out of state wastes ... implicates no constitutional protection.
Just as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of
these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they
restrict that movement.
Id. at 622-23.
54. Id. at 623-24; see also Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause
Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 16
(1990).
55. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
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if the legislative purpose behind the act was to protect the envi-
ronment, 56 the Court said that such legitimate ends are not justi-
fied, absent extraordinary circumstances, if they are achieved
through discriminatory means. 57 The only way to overcome the
presumption of invalidity is for the state to show that the statute
serves a legitimate local interest under the police power and that
there are no alternative, less discriminatory means of promoting
these interests. 58
The Court distinguished the strict standard used to decide
City of Philadelphia from the less stringent standard enunciated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 59 In Pike, the statute under scrutiny regu-
lated evenhandedly and imposed only an incidental burden on in-
terstate commerce. 60 When determining the constitutionality of
statutes of this class, the Court uses a balancing test and will
"uph[o]ld [the legislation] unless the burden imposed on [inter-
state] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative lo-
cal benefits." 6'
Although the City of Philadelphia and Pike tests provide the
56. Id. at 626-27. The Court found that the purpose of the act was immate-
rial for determining its legitimacy. "[Tihe evil of protectionism can reside in
legislative means as well as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether
the ultimate aim ... is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents
or to save remaining open lands from pollution." Id. at 626.
57. Id. at 626-27. In the words of the Court: "[W]hatever NewJersey's ulti-
mate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart
from their origin, to treat them differently." Id.
58. This standard has long been recognized by the Court, most notably in
cases involving "quarantine laws," discussed more fully infra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text. For example, in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), a
Maine statute placed an outright ban on the importation of live baitfish. Id. at
132. Since this constituted facial discrimination, the Court applied the strict
scrutiny test used in City of Philadelphia. See id. at 138. Nevertheless, the statute
was upheld because it protected native species from parasitic infection and there
were no alternative means by which to achieve the same legitimate state interest.
Id. at 151-52; see also Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (upholding New
York statute prohibiting importation of cattle unless they were certified as being
free from Bang's disease).
59. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 139 (1970), an Arizona statute requiring the in-state packaging of canta-
loupes before they could be shipped out-of-state was found to discriminate in
effect against an Arizona grower. Id. at 146. Previously, the grower had relied
on a nearby California packaging plant. Id. at 139. In order to comply with the
statute, the grower would have had to expend $200,000 to establish his own
facility. Id. at 140. The Court found that the burden outweighed Arizona's in-
terest in protecting the general reputation of its cantaloupe industry, especially
considering the superior quality of Church's crop. Id. at 144-46.
60. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142-43.
61. Id. at 142.
1993] 405
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general parameters for Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of
solid waste regulations promulgated at the state level, there are
several important exceptions to these rules.
First, the Court has consistently recognized the legitimacy of
quarantine laws. 62 In so doing, it has differentiated between im-
proper attempts at economic protectionism and valid health and
safety regulation under the police power.63 Although the validity
of quarantine laws has been established primarily in agriculture
cases, there is nothing preventing states from imposing similar
regulations in other contexts. 64
A second type of restriction on interstate commerce which
the courts have upheld is state regulations attempting to prevent
the depletion of scarce natural resources. 65 Cases involving these
62. For example, in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951),
the Court struck down a city ordinance which required all milk sold within the
city limits to be pasteurized within a five mile radius of the center of Madison.
The Court found that the goal of insuring safe milk for city residents, laudable as
it may have been, could have been achieved through other non-discriminatory
means. Id. at 354-55. The Court, relying on Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78
(1891) (holding Virginia statute requiring inspection of all meats slaughtered
more than one hundred miles from place of sale unconstitutional), rejected the
view that the ordinance was non-discriminatory since it burdened Wisconsin
milk suppliers outside the five mile radius as well as suppliers from out-of-state.
Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354 n.4.
63. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S.
511 (1935); Brimmer, 138 U.S. 78 (1891); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313
(1890).
64. See H. P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 531-32 ("[The Court recognizes the]
broad power in the State to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or
safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards even by use of measures which
bear adversely upon interstate commerce.").
65. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 955 (1982). In Sporhase, the Court
struck down a statute which prohibited the transport of ground water to another
state which did not have a reciprocal agreement with Nebraska. Id. at 960. Nev-
ertheless, the Court recognized in dictum that states have a heightened interest
in protecting their water resources. Id. at 956. The Court stated:
[T]he legal expectation that under certain circumstances each state may
restrict water within its borders has been fostered over the years not
only by our equitable apportionment decrees, but also by the negotia-
tion and enforcement of interstate compacts. Our law therefore has
recognized the relevance of state boundaries in the allocation of scarce
water resources.
Id. (citations omitted).
Water, being essential for human life, has traditionally enjoyed a privileged
status. See id. However, the courts, especially in modem cases, have been less
deferential towards state regulation of other natural resources. See, e.g., Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (finding West Virginia statute
unconstitutional which required natural gas producers to supply all domestic
needs before exporting any of their supplies to out-of-state parties); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (finding law prohibiting out-of-state sale of min-
nows unconstitutional) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896),
holding that state's control over wild animals fell beyond reach of Commerce
12
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types of restrictions are relevant to the discussion at hand if land-
fill space is characterized as a natural resource. 66
Perhaps the most important way in which states have avoided
the strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause is through what
has become known as the Market Participant Exception. 67 Under
the Market Participant Exception, a state in its business dealings
may discriminate against out-of-state interests in favor of its own
citizens. 68 Thus, a state-owned enterprise may in some instances
legitimately choose not to conduct business with out-of-state par-
ties. 69 This is true even though regulations restricting privately
owned businesses engaged in exactly the same activity would vio-
late the Commerce Clause. 70
Clause). Although the preservation of landfill space is undoubtedly an impor-
tant conservation measure, it is unlikely that the courts, absent Congressional
legislation, would find that states have the same inherent right to protect landfill
space as they do to preserve the state water supply.
66. In City of Philadelphia, the Court did not directly address the issue of
whether landfill space is a natural resource. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at
627. However, the decision in City of Philadelphia strongly points to such a con-
clusion. Id.
67. The three major cases involving the Market Participant Exception are
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
(upholding requirement by City of Boston that all construction projects funded
with aid of city money employ at least 50% city residents); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding South Dakota's policy of restricting sales from
state-owned cement factory to state residents under Market Participant Excep-
tion); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding Mary-
land program designed to rid state of abandoned automobiles by paying
bounties to scrap processors even though it favored in-state processors over
those from out-of-state).
68. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810. The Court has determined that "[n]othing
in purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others." Id.
69. Id. at 809-10.
70. Id. at 806. Nevertheless, if the state's actions go beyond that of a mar-
ket participant and have the effect of regulating the entire industry, they will in
all likelihood be invalidated by the courts. The limits of the Market Participant
Exception are described in South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984) (holding sales of trees by state-owned corporation conditioned
on trees being processed in-state did not fall under Market Participant Excep-
tion). The Court said:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a
State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a
participant, but allows it to go no further. The State may not impose
conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a sub-
stantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market. Unless the
"market" is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential
of swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial bur-
dens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state
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When a state passes legislation which establishes one stan-
dard for its own citizens and another standard for those outside
its borders, it is fairly clear that the City of Philadelphia test should
be applied. 7' How, though, should municipal or county regula-
tions be judged when they discriminate against non-local inter-
ests, both in-state and out-of-state, in favor of local interests?
Some courts have held that local regulations of this kind are uni-
form since they apply equally to intrastate and interstate com-
merce. 72 Under this view, these local regulations would be
judged according to the less stringent Pike test.
The majority view, though, appears to be that for the pur-
poses of Commerce Clause analysis, it is irrelevant whether the
regulations in question are promulgated by the state or by local
government. 73 If a regulation discriminates against interstate
commerce and gives preferential treatment to in-state parties, it is
facially defective and will be struck down unless it can survive
scrutiny under City of Philadelphia.74 The regulation is no less sus-
ceptible to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause because it has
the added feature of discriminating against in-state individuals as
well as out-of-state parties.7 5
71. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
72. See, e.g., Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d
1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd., 495 A.2d 49 (N.J.
1985); Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417
N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1980).
73. See, e.g., B.F.I. Medical Waste Sys., Inc. v. Whatcom County, 756 F.
Supp. 480 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Industrial Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Moore, 677
F. Supp. 436 (S.D. W. Va. 1987); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County,
556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md. 1983). These decisions correspond with long estab-
lished principles of constitutional law. Over a century ago, in Minnesota v. Bar-
ber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890), the Court said:
[A] statute may upon its face apply equally to the people of all the
states, and yet be a regulation of interstate commerce which a state may
not establish. A burden imposed by a state is not to be sustained sim-
ply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the
states, including the state enacting such statute.
Id. at 326. The modem Court has continued to adhere to this position. For
example, in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), discussed
supra note 62, relying on Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (holding Vir-
ginia statute requiring inspection of all meats slaughtered more than one hun-
dred miles from place of sale unconstitutional), the Court rejected the view that
the milk ordinance was non-discriminatory since it burdened Wisconsin suppli-
ers outside the five mile radius as well as suppliers from out-of-state. Dean Milk
Co., 340 U.S. at 354 n.4.
74. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627. The key to the analysis is not
whether there are in-state parties which are discriminated against but whether
there are out-of-state parties who are discriminated against.
75. See Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354; Barber, 136 U.S. at 326.
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IV. DISCUSSION
In deciding Fort Gratiot, the Supreme Court focused its in-
quiry on the specific question of "the validity of the [Michigan]
Waste Import Restrictions as they apply to privately owned and
operated landfills."' 76 It is important to recognize that the impact
of the Court's decision on state efforts to restrict the importation
of out-of-state waste is limited from the outset by a narrow fram-
ing of the issue. The Court explicitly refrained from deciding any
questions pertaining to the constitutionality of three important is-
sues: 1) Michigan's 1978 SWMA as enacted and implemented
prior to the 1988 Waste Import Restrictions amendments; 77 2)
restrictions on the importation of hazardous waste based on pub-
lic health and safety considerations; 78 and 3) states acting as mar-
ket participants. 79
In reaching its decision, the Court relied extensively on City
of Philadelphia.80 Initially, the Court dismissed any claims that the
Michigan regulations fell outside the power of the Commerce
Clause. The Court recognized that no matter how the business
activities of Ft. Gratiot and its out-of-state customers are charac-
terized, the transportation of solid waste over state lines falls
under the rubric of interstate commerce. 8'
The Court, following the Dormant Commerce Clause analy-
76. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023.
77. Id.
78. Id. Although not directly addressing the validity of hazardous waste
regulations in Fort Gratiot, the Court in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992), demonstrated that the strict scrutiny test of City of
Philadelphia would be applied in hazardous waste casesas well. Id. at 2015 & n.6.
The major distinction between regulations controllirkg hazardous waste and
those controlling nonhazardous waste is factual. Although the same constitu-
tional standard is applied to both, the former may present health and safety con-
siderations which warrant protection under the "quarantine" exception of the
Commerce Clause while the latter does not. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
For an analysis of the specific problems associated -with state efforts to ban
hazardous waste imports, see Brietzke, supra note 51; Stone, supra note 54.
79. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. For a discussion of the Market Partici-
pant Exception, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Also, the impact
of the Court's failure to address this issue is discussed infra notes 121-23 and
accompanying text.
80. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. For a discussion of City of Philadelphia,
see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
81. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. In the words of the Court: "Whether the
business arrangements between out-of-state generatorsof waste and the Michi-
gan operator of a waste disposal site are viewed as 'sales' of garbage or
'purchases' of transportation and disposal services, the commercial transactions
unquestionably have an interstate character." Id.
15
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sis set forth in City of Philadelphia,82 applied a strict scrutiny test to
the Michigan statute. 3 The Court said that the statute facially
discriminated against interstate commerce since it authorized
every county in Michigan to "isolate itself from the national econ-
omy."8 4 Furthermore, the Court found that Michigan had failed
to give any reason, other than the waste's point of origin, for dis-
criminating against out-of-county waste.8 5 Therefore, the Michi-
gan statute did not pass constitutional muster under the strict
scrutiny test of City of Philadelphia.86
Michigan attempted to distinguish the Waste Import Restric-
tions at issue from those struck down in City of Philadelphia.8 7 It
maintained that the statute regulated evenhandedly to promote
local interests and that the Court should therefore uphold the re-
strictions under the less stringent standard of Pike."" Under that
test, Michigan maintained that the regulations should be upheld
since "the burden on interstate commerce is not clearly excessive
in relation to the local benefits."8 9
Nevertheless, the Court did not determine whether the regu-
lations would have passed scrutiny under the Pike test since
it rejected Michigan's claim that the regulations were
"evenhanded.' 90
In determining that the statute did not regulate evenhand-
edly, the Court compared the Michigan statute to state regula-
tions imposed on the food industry which have consistently been
82. For a discussion of the Dormant Commerce Clause test set forth in City
of Philadelphia, see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
83. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
84. Id. at 2024. The Court emphasized this point as follows: "Indeed, un-
less a county acts affirmatively to permit other waste to enter its jurisdiction, the
statute affords local waste producers complete protection from competition
from out-of-state waste producers who seek to use local waste disposal areas."
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2028.
87. Id. at 2024.
88. For a discussion of the standard under Pike, see supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
89. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
90. Id. It is worth noting that even if the court had applied the Pike test, the
regulations would probably still have been struck down in light of the opinion
that Michigan had failed to identify any reason apart from origin why solid waste
coming from outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste
within the county. See id.; cf Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F.
Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 939 F.2d 941 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding ban of
out-of-county waste unconstitutional under Pike test even though it was not
invalid per se under City of Philadelphia).
16
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found to violate the Commerce Clause. 9' A common characteris-
tic of those food regulations is that they gave preferential treat-
ment to local interests at the expense of both in-state and out-of-
state non-local interests. 92 However, the Court has refused to
find that the discriminatory character of such regulations is dimin-
ished solely because they penalize both in-state and out-of-state
interests. 93 In Fort Gratiot, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this
long held position.94
The Court also noted that the discriminatory character of the
Michigan statute was not changed merely because it did not re-
quire counties to ban out-of-state wastes or because some coun-
ties in Michigan permitted the importation of out-of-county and
out-of-state wastes.95 As in City of Philadelphia, flexibility built into
the statute allowing exceptions to the general restraints imposed
on interstate commerce was found not to negate the discrimina-
tion, but merely to limit the scope of the discrimination.96
Michigan also tried to distinguish this case from City of Phila-
delphia on the grounds that the SWMA is not an economic protec-
tionist measure but rather a "comprehensive health and safety
regulation. '97 Michigan argued that landfill space was a natural
resource which needed to be preserved for the benefit of its citi-
zens.98 Although the Court conceded that "in times of severe
shortage" states may implement policies to protect certain natu-
ral resources99 such as groundwater, it determined that Michigan
had neither shown a severe shortage of a natural resource nor
that the statute served to protect that resource in the most non-
91. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2025. The Court relied on Brimmer and Dean
Milk, discussed supra note 62.
92. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2025.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2025-26. In the words of the Court: "[O]ur prior cases teach that
a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the
Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through
subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself." Id. at 2024.
95. Id. at 2025.
96. Id. Apparently, when determining whether a law discriminates against
interstate commerce, the extent of the discrimination is of little import: either
the law discriminates or it does not. See id.
97. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2026.
98. Id. Michigan relied extensively in their argument on Sporhase v. Ne-
braska, 458 U.S. 955 (1982), discussed supra note 65.
99. The Court never definitively answered the question of whether landfill
space would ever be classified in this category. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at
2026-27. Nevertheless, it recognized that states have traditionally enjoyed a le-
gitimate expectation of control over private landfills. Id. at 2027 n.7.
1993]
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discriminatory fashion. 100
However, the Court recognized that if the banned out-of-
state waste possessed other characteristics which made importing
it inherently dangerous, the result could have been different.' 0 '
For example, restrictions on the importation of certain animals
and agricultural products have been upheld where there was a
risk of contaminating native species.' 02 Thus, after the decision
there remained the possibility that the banning of other types of
waste, such as hazardous wastes, might be justified notwithstand-
ing the Commerce Clause.' 0 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, criticized the major-
ity's disposition of the case on the grounds that the SWMA is di-
rected at what are arguably "legitimate local concerns."'' 0 4
Although his opinion provides a forceful argument for imple-
menting restrictions on the interstate transportation of solid
waste,' 0 5 it does not persuasively refute the majority's view.
Given the discriminatory effect of the Michigan statute, the legis-
lature's purpose in enacting it is largely irrelevant. 0 6 The major-
100. Id. at 2027. The Court said that there were other means by which
Michigan could slow the influx of waste into its landfills. Id.
101. Id. The dissent, in fact, argued that the case should be remanded so
that Michigan could have the opportunity to show that the statute addressed
legitimate concerns of local health and safety. Id. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting). Of course, to a certain extent solid waste is inherently dangerous. Ob-
viously, a major impetus behind the creation of landfills and the unwillingness of
many communities to provide sites for new landfills is the recognition of the
undesirability and potential health risks associated with garbage. See id.
However, there is a significant difference between the dangers posed by
solid waste and those posed by tainted agricultural products. The former are
readily apparent and are no greater than those presented by in-state solid waste.
In contrast, contaminated agricultural products transported into a state cause
more troubling consequences. First, safeguards imposed by the state to protect
consumers are undermined when out-of-state products are introduced into the
marketplace. Second, and most importantly, infectious products have the po-
tential of not only spreading disease directly but also of contaminating entire
industries by creating an epidemic.
102. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131
(1986), discussed supra note 58).
103. Id. As indicated by Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.
Ct. 2009 (1992), discussed supra note 12, though, the Court is unlikely to sanc-
tion discriminatory state legislation involving hazardous waste unless the state
demonstrates a health and safety interest related to the waste's point of origin.
Id. at 2016.
104. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist would have remanded the case to allow Michigan to argue this
point. Id.
105. See id at 2028-32.
106. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626. For Commerce Clause analysis,
differences between purposes and ends have been found to be largely irrelevant.
Id. Rehnquist appears to conclude that the nature of solid waste shows in and of
[Vol. IV: p. 395
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ity was therefore correct in following City of Philadelphia and
holding the Michigan statute unconstitutional.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to overlook
the narrowness of the majority's holding. His suggestion that the
Court's decision will "encourag[e] each state to ignore the waste
problem in the hope that another will pick up the slack"' 0 7 over-
dramatizes the impact of the majority's position.'0 8 First, the
Court's holding does not preclude the continuation of most forms
of environmental regulation at the state level.' 09 Second, the
Court apparently would uphold import restrictions in the future if
they promoted sufficient health or safety concerns not present in
Fort Gratiot.l l0 Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently dis-
counts the ability of Michigan's citizens to address their concerns
through the national political process."I '
In the final analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument is
not so much wrong as it is irrelevant. The fundamental question
in Fort Gratiot is not whether state restrictions on the importation
of solid waste are the best way to solve a mounting environmental
crisis. Rather, it is whether under our federal system, the states
are the proper forum in which to address the problem. The ma-
jority recognized that the role of the Court is not to impose its
views of correct economic and environmental policy on the
itself that there are legitimate local purposes. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
However, the majority opinion makes clear that such an argument was never
raised, let alone substantiated, by the State of Michigan. Id. at 2026-27 & n.8.
107. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
108. Given Chief Justice Rehnquist's conservative judicial philosophy, one
must question whether he is as much concerned with the future of the environ-
ment as he is with the encroachment on states' rights by the federal government.
See Glenn A. Phelps, The Myth ofJurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional
Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1991).
109. In both Fort Gratiot and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. the Court gives
examples of what would be valid regulations. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027;
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 2015. Although the effectiveness of
environmental regulation may arguably be diminished by the decision, there re-
main large incentives to implement environmental regulation. Imposing uni-
form standards for the disposal of solid waste within Michigan would indirectly
force out-of-state parties to raise their standards. This type of regulation,
although still subject to scrutiny under the Pike standard, would be much more
likely to be found constitutional.
110. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
111. ChiefJustice Rehnquist is not alone in thinking that the national polit-
ical process may be an inadequate forum in which to solve the solid waste prob-
lem. See, e.g., Pomper, supra note 2, at 1316-17. However, the ability of
Congress to pass environmental legislation addressing a wide variety of
problems including water pollution, air pollution, and nuclear waste disposal
demonstrates that it is possible to get this type of legislation enacted. See Harpr-
ing, supra note 2, at 861.
19931 413
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states.' 1 2 A major impetus behind the adoption of our federal
system was the realization that a system of free trade was impera-
tive if our country was to survive." 13 Under the Constitution, the
states have relinquished their power to regulate interstate com-
merce to Congress." 14 In Fort Gratiot, the Court reaffirmed its
long held position that states may not, except under extraordi-
nary circumstances, act in contradiction to this general prohibi-
tion."15  Whatever the ultimate merits of a state policy
discriminating against interstate commerce may be, the Court
lacks the authority to sanction that which is void ab initio.1 16
V. CONCLUSION
By striking down Michigan's SWMA in Fort Gratiot, the
Supreme Court has sent a message not only to Michigan but to all
fifty states that environmental legislation which imposes restric-
112. Of course, Michigan approves of the policy. However, the Court in its
decision is protecting not only the interests of Ft. Gratiot but also the interests
of out-of-state parties who may wish to do business with Ft. Gratiot. While
Rehnquist may be correct that the statute places a burden on Michigan's resi-
dents, this has not and should not be the test for determining whether a law is
discriminatory. In theory, all restrictions on free trade place burdens on in-state
residents. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMIcs 732-59 (6th ed. 1981) (dis-
cussing general economic principles of free trade). History has demonstrated,
most notably in the context of racial discrimination, that in-state political re-
straints are not always sufficient to prevent discrimination. SeeJohnJ. Donohue
III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1420 (1986) ("[I]t is the gov-
ernment-which may resort to pernicious legislation such as the apartheid laws
in South Africa-not the free market, that stands as the potential enemy of the
victims of discriminatory conduct."); Martin J. Katz, The Economics of Discrimina-
tion: The Three Fallacies of Croson, 100 YALE L.J. 1033, 1038-39 (1991). Often, a
majority of state residents may be willing to shoulder a slightly increased burden
which subjects a small minority of the state's population to an even greater hard-
ship. See, e.g., Katz, supra, at 1038-39 ("Consumers may be willing to pay more
for white-made products; or white workers may be willing to accept a cut in pay
to work in an all-white work environment. Any of these forms of discrimination
will raise the cost of hiring blacks, so that a profit-maximizing employer will pre-
fer to hire whites."); see also LIPSEY & STEINER, supra, at 368-77 (discussing gen-
eral economic principles of discrimination).
Presumably, the dissenters believe that they are protecting the fundamental
state right of Michigan to govern its own affairs. However, if the Court had
upheld the MSWA, it would have been abridging the rights of other states to
have access to open markets. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 535 (1949). If the Court begins making exceptions to the general principle
of free trade between the states based on its own policy considerations, there
will be very little preventing the states from setting up substantial trade barriers
in a multitude of other contexts.
113. See H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533.
114. Id. at 533-34.
115. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023-24.
116. Id.
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tions on interstate commerce will undergo rigorous scrutiny by
the courts. The rules enunciated in City of Philadelphia have be-
come firmly entrenched principles of Constitutional law. Any in-
dication that the Court might retreat from the core holding of City
of Philadelphia has been repudiated." 17
Undoubtedly, some commentators may view the Fort Gratiot
decision as a terrible defeat for environmentalists." 8 However, a
more optimistic view towards the prospects of solving the nation's
solid waste crisis is warranted. States still have several significant
avenues available by which they can not only regulate the influx of
solid waste into their existing landfills today but can also plan for
their solid waste disposal needs of the Twenty-First Century.
First, states like Michigan, as long as they do not discriminate
against out-of-state interests in favor of their own citizens, may
continue to impose rigorous environmentally based regulations
for solid waste disposal within their borders." 9 By raising their
own environmental standards, landfill states may indirectly cause
garbage exporting states to promote conservation.' 20 Thus,
while states may not place blanket prohibitions on the importa-
tion of out-of-state waste, they may still be able to substantially
ebb the flow of such waste.
Second, states which are concerned about their future ability
to provide landfill space for their own citizens may actively pre-
serve landfill space under the Market Participant Exception.' 2 '
Fort Gratiot in no way prevents publicly-owned landfills from dis-
criminating against out-of-state parties.' 22 Also, through the
117. Id. at 2021.
118. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, High Court Rejects State Waste Disposal Limits,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1992, at A3; David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Curbs on
Waste Dumps; Law: States Are Barred from Imposing Bans and Higher Fees on Garbage
and Toxic Materials from Outside Their Borders, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at A12.
119. This will undoubtedly raise the costs of solid waste disposal. There
may be limits to how far a state can go in this direction. However, the Court has
indicated that the limits are fairly broad. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-
27. Presumably, intra-county planning would be permissible as well, as long as it
did not impinge on out-of-state interests.
120. This is accomplished in two ways. First, if a state wants to continue to
export solid waste to the landfill state, they will have to comply with the height-
ened standards. Second, if a state chooses not to comply, it will be forced to
either find another state which will accept the waste or increase its own landfill
capacity. If enough landfill states raise their standards, finding alternative out-
of-state landfill sites will not be a viable option. Conversely, if the state chooses
to use in-state landfills to handle the surplus waste, in-state political pressure to
adopt conservation measures will increase.
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power of eminent domain, states may take control of some or all
privately-owned landfill facilities within their borders.123 Thus, as
a market participant, a state may very well be able to accomplish
what Michigan was unable to do through regulation.
Third, the Fort Gratiot decision does not preclude Congress
from enacting a comprehensive, national policy for solid waste
management which would alleviate many, if not all, of the
problems which have prompted states like Michigan to implement
waste import restrictions. 124 Of course, there may continue to be
substantial political resistance to the implementation of a national
solid waste management plan, especially from states which
currently are relying heavily on out-of-state landfill space.' 25
Nevertheless, Congressional regulation of similar environmental
problems, including the disposal of hazardous and nuclear
wastes, demonstrates that such obstacles are not necessarily
insurmountable. 126
Rather than being a roadblock for the environmental move-
ment, it is quite possible that Fort Gratiot will prove to be a catalyst
for change. Prior to the 1992 decisions of the Court, a persuasive
argument could have been made that a national solid waste man-
agement plan was unnecessary since state and local government
could more easily and more efficiently address the problem. 27
However, after Fort Gratiot, the validity of such an argument has
lost much of its force. Therefore, both the need for Congres-
sional action and the likelihood of such action is now much
greater than it was prior to the decision.
Regardless of how, or indeed whether, this issue is resolved
in the national political arena, the Court was correct in refusing to
sanction Michigan's solution to the problem. If Congress is un-
able to develop a national policy for solving the growing environ-
mental crisis of solid waste disposal in our country, it may well
deserve to be blamed for the result. However, the apparent fail-
ure of the national political process to address important issues
does not give the Supreme Court powers which under our Consti-
tution have been delegated to another branch of government.
Howard G. Hopkirk
123. See Meyers, supra note 2, at 580-81.
124. See supra note 111.
125. See Harpring, supra note 2, at 872 & n.122.
126. See supra note 43.
127. See, e.g., Hinshaw, supra note 41.
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